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Employment Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Pregnancy discrimination exhibits a coherent social logic. The exclusion
of women from employment on the basis of pregnancy perpetuates the
sexual division of productive and reproductive labor, thereby confirming
women's second class status in the work force. The Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 19781 amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 by
clarifying that the Act's proscription of sex-based employment discrimina-
tion includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.' The PDA has
been construed to require that pregnant employees be treated comparably
with others on the basis of ability or inability to work.4 This Note chal-
lenges the sufficiency of a standard of comparable treatment on statutory
and broader, equitable grounds.
When construed as integral to Title VII, the PDA authorizes both a
disparate treatment and a disparate impact cause of action. It thus entitles
plaintiffs to challenge overtly exclusionary and facially neutral practices 5
that circumscribe women's employment opportunities on the basis of preg-
nancy.' Under Title VII as amended, women are entitled to demand, not
1. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)) [here-
inafter cited as "the PDA" or "the amendment"].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as "Title VII" or "the Act"].
3. The PDA amends Title VII's definitional provisions, and reads in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in
section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
4. See infra pp. 931-33.
5. Facially neutral practices susceptible to disparate impact challenge include leave policies and
job definitions, discussed infra Part II.
6. The coverage of the PDA is limited to "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). Pregnancy and childbirth are moments in the human reproductive
process specific to women, and must be distinguished from childrearing, the social process of parent-
ing, commonly performed by women, but not biologically specific to them. Conflicts between parent-
ing and employment, no less than conflicts between pregnancy and employment, have a disparate
impact on women in the workplace. Both institutionally enforce women's relegation to the domestic
sphere. See Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59
B.U.L. REV. 55 (1979). However, as a legal matter, the problems they pose remain distinct. Conflicts
between parenting and employment require solution in gender neutral terms, see, e.g., Comment,
Parental Leaves of Absence for Men, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 273 (1982), and, as such, remain outside
the scope of the present discussion.
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only comparable treatment, but that measure of institutional accommoda-
tion necessary to bear children without forfeit of employment opportuni-
ties. So construed, the PDA will secure for women a workplace organized
with reference to female, as well as male, reproductive norms.'
The debate over the proper construction of the PDA is significant for
sex discrimination doctrine generally. Where doctrine has understood
equality as a relation between the similarly situated,8 a theory of equality
recognizing reproductive difference is necessary to implement the PDA's
proscription of pregnancy-based employment discrimination. Unlike dis-
crimination premised on stereotypical distinctions between the sexes, preg-
nancy discrimination involves the social valuation of a real sexual differ-
ence. This process of valuation is both institutional and ideological;
attitudes about women's reproductive role produce, and are produced by,
institutional arrangements that define a biological capacity as a social dis-
ability. Doctrine has inquired whether pregnancy is like or unlike other
sex-common conditions, hence deserving of comparable treatment. It has
framed the question so as to miss the fundamental issue for equality anal-
ysis: How, as a sex-specific capacity, is women's reproductive role system-
atically devalued? The PDA offers doctrine an opportunity to move be-
yond formal concepts of equality between the sexes, and identify the real
institutional barriers to its attainment.
I. INTERPRETING THE PDA
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert9 provided the immediate impetus for the passage of the
PDA. In Gilbert, the Court held that, under Title VII, the exclusion of
pregnancy coverage from an otherwise comprehensive disability benefits
program did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court
reasoned that the pregnancy classification was not sex-based, as it divided
7. The workplace may be organized to accommodate or to conflict with biological necessities (eat-
ing, sleeping, childbirth) and dysfunctions (illness, injury). The organization of the workplace does not
in any sense reflect the realities of biological process, but, rather, social judgments as to the impor-
tance of accommodating them. Eighty-five percent of working women are likely to become pregnant at
least once during their working lives. S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLi-
eES AND WORKING WOMEN 25 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. KAMERMAN]. A workplace that does
not provide for pregnancy in the normal course of employment is organized around male reproductive
norms, reflecting a social judgment that women's necessary role in the human reproductive process is
incompatible with employment, as society chooses to define it.
8. For the classic formulation of this thesis, see Tussman & tenBrouk, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). For a critique of the model as indeterminately formal, see
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). For a feminist critique of this
concept of equality, see C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101-141
(1979). The broader equitable implications of the debate over the PDA's construction are discussed
infra Part V.
9. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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the universe of beneficiaries into "'pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons."" It further asserted that because pregnancy was "an addi-
tional risk, unique to women," there could be no sex discrimination in
excluding its coverage."
Congress moved swiftly to repudiate the Court's construction of
Title VII. It passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,12 which
effectively reversed Gilbert by amending the definitional provisions of
Title VII to include pregnancy within the meaning of "sex."'" A debate
is now taking shape over the proper construction of the amendment,' 4 as
the range of challenged practices widens beyond the disability benefits
context.
A. Current Interpretation of the PDA
As currently construed, the PDA requires that employers treat the
pregnant employee the same as others on the basis of ability or inability to
work.' 5 This "parity of treatment" standard is of immediate practical
10. 429 U.S. at 135. In so holding, the Court adopted the reasoning of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974) (equal protection challenge to state disability benefits program). Geduldig still con-
trols as a matter of constitutional law. But cf. Hanson v. Hoffmann, 628 F.2d 42, 47-48 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (developments in Title VII doctrine may modify constitutional analysis under Geduldig). For a
critique and proposed revision of equal protection analysis as it bears on the issue of reproductive
difference, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984).
11. 429 U.S. at 139. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist thus advanced an assimila-
tionist theory of equality: Women can seek equality with men only to the extent they are like men. By
its terms no equality claim could be made out with respect to pregnancy, even where, as in Gilbert, a
program provided benefits for all other disabilities-including those specific to the male reproductive
system. Gilbert's reasoning was unequivocally rejected by Congress in passing the PDA. See infra
note 13 and accompanying text. The central question posed by the Gilbert decision remains, however,
unresolved: To what extent may women raise equality claims based on the sexual difference posed by
pregnancy? This question organizes the debate over the proper construction of the PDA which this
Note joins.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The relevant text of the PDA is quoted supra note 3.
13. Once pregnancy is legally defined as a classification on the basis of sex, a comprehensive
disability benefits program that excludes coverage only for pregnancy must automatically violate
Title VII. For congressional criticism of the Gilbert opinion, see H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749-65; S. REP. No. 331, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977).
14. Because the amendment's force is prospective, the majority of pregnancy discrimination claims
litigated since the PDA's passage have been decided under pre-amendment law. Only recently has a
body of law construing the PDA begun to accumulate. See infra notes 15, 21, 55, 71, 72, 80.
15. Parity defenses have been accepted in numerous cases litigated under the PDA. See, e.g.,
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal.
1984); Brown-Weathersby v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, No. 82-C-2351, slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1983);
Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 707 F.2d
1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Barone v. Hackett, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1765 (D.R.I. 1982);
Conners v. University of Tenn. Press, 558 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
The parity interpretation has received its most sustained explication and defense to date in Wil-
liams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs.
L. REP. 175, 190-200 (1982). Even commentators who criticize the parity standard on equitable
grounds have nonetheless presumed it to control as a matter of law under Title VII, as amended. See,
e.g., 1 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 38.22 at 8-34 to 8-35 (1984);
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power. It bars pregnancy-specific benefit exclusions of the type at issue in
Gilbert, as well as leave requirements, hiring and firing practices, and any
other policy that singles out pregnancy for exclusionary treatment.16 The
pregnant employee cannot be compelled to take leave when others are not,
nor denied leave to which others are entitled.
Despite its capacity to proscribe many traditional forms of pregnancy
discrimination, the parity standard in fact represents a narrow construc-
tion of the PDA. The constraints it imposes on the amendment's coverage
flow from its strictly formal definition of equality. As currently construed,
the PDA ratifies all practices that treat pregnancy comparably with other
disabilities, even though such facially neutral practices may have an exclu-
sionary impact on pregnant employees. Thus, courts have held there to be
no cognizable sex discrimination in a facially neutral leave policy inade-
quate for childbearing, even though such a policy ensures the termination
of the pregnant employee as surely as would a pregnancy-specific dismis-
sal rule.17 Such gaps in coverage affect those most in need of the PDA's
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Preg-
nancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV. 63, 83-84, 103
(1980); Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513, 518-19 (1983); Scales, Towards a
Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 403-04 (1981). But cf. Comment, Sexual Equality Under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 690 (1983) (pluralist model of equality recog-
nizing differences between sexes appropriate to construing PDA); Rigler, Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC and Sex Discrimination Under Title VII: Some Questions Answered,
Others Remain, 88 DICK. L. REV. 357, 364-66 (1984) (status of disparate impact claims under PDA
unresolved); Note, The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Problem of Interpretation, 58 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 607 (1980) (congressional endorsement of parity principles and conflicting EEOC disparate
impact guideline necessitates judicial resolution of PDA's mandate).
16. The EEOC has published a list of 37 questions and answers detailing the application of
parity principles to a range of employment practices affected by the amendment's passage. See 29
C.F.R. Pt. 1604 app. (1984). Cases litigated under pre-PDA law demonstrate the prevalence and
variety of such practices. They include: conditioning job eligibility upon pregnancy or fertility; rever-
sal of decision to hire upon notice of pregnancy; immediate termination upon notice of pregnancy;
conditioning of employment upon immediate notification of pregnancy or upon continued medical
verification of ability to perform; conditioning eligibility for maternity leave upon years of service;
"stop work" policies requiring unpaid maternity leave to begin at the onset of pregnancy or several
months thereafter; denial of fringe benefits during maternity leave (inclusive of disability benefits, sick
leave, and company paid health insurance premiums); conditioning eligibility for pregnancy benefits
upon marital status; "start work" policies forbidding return to work until weeks or months after
delivery (or the onset of a normal menstrual cycle, see Harper v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 619 F.2d 489
(5th Cir. 1980)); loss of seniority upon return from leave; refusal to guarantee reinstatement; and
conditional reinstatement which may involve extensive delays, placement in another job, or reduction
in hours.
It is this tradition of aggravated hostility to pregnancy in the workplace that gives the parity stan-
dard its transformative power. The simple imperative of comparable treatment proscribes in one
stroke all of the above enumerated practices.
17. Under the PDA as currently construed, an employer may fire an employee because she is
pregnant, as long as the employer persuades the court that the firing is non-"pretextual," i.e., that the
employer has or would have treated other disabled employees similarly. Once an employer success-
fully defends on parity grounds, pregnancy may be deemed "not a factor in any action taken by
defendants." Conners v. University of Tenn. Press, 558 F. Supp. 38, 41 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); accord
Brown-Weathersby v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, No. 82-C-2351, slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1983);
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benefits: women employed in unorganized sectors of the economy, receiv-
ing low levels of fringe benefits. 8 Until general benefit levels increase,
their situation would appear to be without remedy. According to strict
adherents to a parity interpretation of the amendment, the PDA pro-
scribes, as "reverse discrimination,"' 9 all efforts to accommodate preg-
nancy in the workplace, whether voluntarily undertaken by an em-
ployer,2" or mandated by state law.2' So construed, the PDA is now
inhibiting initiatives to supplement its coverage.22
Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206, 211-12 (E.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 707
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
A leading commentator on employment discrimination has observed, "Clearly, if an employer says,
'All pregnant employees will be fired,' there is sex discrimination. It is really no different in effect to
say, 'No maternity leaves will be granted."' A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 15, at 8-31.
18. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 15, at 520-22.
19. See infra note 21.
20. See Barone v. Hackett, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1765, 1769 n.4 (D.R.I. 1982) (court
holds that PDA requires only comparable treatment, reserving question of whether employer's volun-
tary provision of unpaid maternity leave discriminates against employees disabled for other cause).
21. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562
(C.D. Cal. 1984). The Cal Fed court held that the PDA preempted California law requiring employ-
ers to provide pregnant employees unpaid disability leave of up to four months and job reinstatement
rights within a reasonable time of their return. The court ruled that California's provision of "prefer-
ential reinstatement rights" was "inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in enacting the Pregnancy
Discrimination Amendment," and that compliance with state law would subject employers to "reverse
discrimination suits under Title VII brought by temporarily disabled males who [did] not receive the
same treatment as female employees disabled by pregnancy." Id. at 568.
In Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981),
vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982), a federal court refused to recog-
nize a similar preemption challenge to Montana's Maternity Leave Act, on the narrow grounds that
there was no necessary conflict between federal and state statutes. An employer could amend its leave
policy to increase leave for all employees, such that the company would satisfy Montana's maternity
leave requirement, without violating the PDA's mandate of comparable treatment. The court recog-
nized, however, that were a disparate impact cause of action available under the PDA, federal and
state law would be consistent-both requiring adequate leave for childbearing purposes. 515 F. Supp.
at 1267.
The preemption challenge to Montana's law was dismissed on appeal for lack of federal jurisdic-
tion, and the judgment below vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982). The preemption claim was
subsequently raised in state court, where the Supreme Court of Montana ultimately sustained the
state's maternity leave requirement as consistent with Title VII, on the grounds that the PDA itself
proscribes facially neutral employment policies having a disparate impact on pregnant women.
Miller-Wohl's no-leave rule violated both state and federal law, each of which required the provision
of adequate leave to pregnant women. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., No. 84-
172, slip. op. (Mont. Dec. 28, 1984). A similar argument has been raised on appeal in the Cal Fed
case. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Equal Rights Advocates at 20-29, California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, Nos. 84-5843 and 84-5844 (9th Cir. 1984). For additional arguments against pre-
emption, see Krieger & Cooney, supra note 15, at 522-25, 531-33.
22. Press coverage of the preemption controversy, see supra note 21, has publicized the potentially
negative thrust of the PDA's mandate. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1984, at Dl, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1984, at Fl, col. 2. It is not unlikely that the threat of liability has deterred employers and
unions from exploring possible accommodations of pregnancy in the workplace.
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B. Construing the PDA Within Title VII
Those advancing a parity interpretation of the PDA23 err by treating it
as an independent statutory enactment, rather than as an amendment to a
highly developed statutory scheme. The PDA itself provides no substan-
tive rule to govern pregnancy discrimination claims. Rather, Congress in-
serted the amendment, section 701(k), in the Act's definitional provi-
sions, 4 where it now functions to supplement the meaning of "sex"
within the Act as a whole.2 5 The PDA thus finds substantive force
through sections 703(a)(1) and (2), which enumerate the employment
practices proscribed under the Act.26
As the Court has construed section 703(a), plaintiffs may challenge
practices that are discriminatory in intent ("disparate treatment") or effect
("disparate impact").2 7  The parity standard, which requires that the
pregnant employee be treated the same as others on the basis of ability or
inability to work, makes dissimilar, or exclusionary, treatment of the
pregnant employee actionable under Title VII in accordance with tradi-
tional disparate treatment principles.2" The parity standard, however, is
23. See supra note 15.
24. Section 701 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)] defines a range of terms for the purposes of
Title VII, including "person," "employer," "employee," and "industry affecting commerce."
25. The Senate Report states that the "bill . . . does not alter the basic principles of title VII law
as regards sex discrimination. Rather, this legislation clarifies the definition of sex discrimination for
title VII purposes." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 5-6. The House Report states: "Pregnancy-
based distinctions will be subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimi-
nation proscribed in the existing statute." H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 4.
26. Section 703(a)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
. . . or otherwise to discriminate . . . with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of . . . sex." Section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees. . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
27. The Supreme Court distinguished the two causes of action in International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court observed that claims of disparate treatment may be
alleged where
[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "disparate im-
pact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. at 335 n.15 (citation omitted).
28. The requirement of similar treatment operates to identify and proscribe exclusionary animus
toward pregnancy in the workplace. E.g. "[Cilassifications are in order provided that, in their rela-
tionship to each other, they do not discriminate against pregnancy. [A disability policy can classify]
provided that, inherently, it does not simply pick out pregnancy and put a fixed and arbitrary limit on
that." 123 CONG. REc. 29,659 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits).
Strictly speaking, the sexes cannot be treated similarly with respect to pregnancy. As a sex-specific
trait, pregnancy is in many important respects unlike other (non-sex-linked) conditions that may
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inconsistent with a disparate impact claim. The disparate impact claim
allows plaintiffs to challenge facially neutral employment practices, which
by definition treat employees "comparably," but nonetheless have an ex-
clusionary impact on the Act's protected classes." If courts hold a stan-
dard of comparable treatment to govern exclusively under the PDA, the
amendment will bar a disparate impact cause of action for pregnancy dis-
crimination, rendering the pregnancy discrimination claim inferior in sta-
tus to all other race- and sex-based claims.
No evidence in the legislative history suggests Congress intended the
amendment to have this effect. Rather, that history, analyzed in light of
the developments in Title VII doctrine which precipitated the amend-
ment's passage, makes clear that a disparate impact cause of action for
pregnancy discrimination not only survived the PDA's enactment, but is
fully consistent with its purposes.
C. The PDA as a Response to Gilbert and Satty
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,30 the Supreme Court refused to rec-
ognize a pregnancy classification as sex-based." It thus foreclosed dispa-
rate treatment analysis of exclusionary pregnancy policies, requiring
plaintiffs to prove that policies incorporating such "facially neutral" clas-
sifications had a disparate impact on women generally. A year later in
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 3 the Court employed disparate impact analy-
sis to invalidate a maternity leave policy requiring forfeit of all accrued
seniority. It distinguished Gilbert, observing: "[P]etitioner has not merely
refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive,
prove temporarily disabling for an employee, see infra p. 942. However, the requirement that preg-
nancy be treated as well as these other, non-sex-linked conditions serves to root out invidious, sex-
based employment decisions, the object of disparate treatment analysis.
29. The facially neutral practices that the Supreme Court invalidated in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment tests and requirement of high school diploma), and Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height-weight requirements), treated all job applicants "compara-
bly," but nonetheless favored whites and males by establishing job requirements in their social and
biological image. Unlike disparate treatment doctrine (which presumes those of different race or sex to
be similarly situated), disparate impact doctrine recognizes heterogeneity among racial and sexual
groups. It proscribes employment practices that discriminate on the basis of such group differences
unless strictly justified by business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430 (objec-
tive of Title VII to remove barriers that have operated to favor an identifiable group of employees
and thus to "'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices").
30. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
31. Id. at 134-35.
32. Sd. at 136-40. Acknowledging that disparate impact analysis provided an alternate ground for
plaintiff's claim, Justice Rehnquist nonetheless appeared more interested in abolishing the cause of
action than in evaluating it. His efforts were soundly repudiated in concurring opinions by Justice
Stewart, id. at 146, and Justice Blackmun, id. at 146, and in vigorous dissents by Justice Brennan
(joined by Justice Marshall), id. at 153-55, and Justice Stevens, id. at 160-61.
33. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suf-
fer." 4 Although the Court now discerned a tighter nexus between preg-
nancy and sex, it deemed only some, not all, express pregnancy exclusions
to have a disparate impact on women."
It was in this doctrinal context that Congress intervened to amend
Title VII. The PDA rectified the inequities of "disparate impact" analy-
sis under Gilbert and Satty by reversing its major premise: that pregnancy
classifications were gender neutral, rather than sex-based. As the House
Report describes, the PDA's purpose was
to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect
the commonsense view and to ensure that working women are pro-
tected against all forms of employment discrimination based on sex.
By making clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se vio-
lations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in most in-
stances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the
difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty. 6
Congress did not abolish "the impact approach" but instead restored it to
its original purpose: the evaluation of facially neutral employment
practices. 31
34. Id. at 142. The Court sustained another element of defendant's policy, denying women ac-
crued sick pay for childbearing purposes, under the authority of Gilbert. Title VII did not require
that "greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other 'because of their differing roles in the
scheme of human existence."' Id. Satty thus acknowledged that reproductive difference could form the
basis of a disparate impact claim, but only in limited instances.
Salty's "benefits-burden" distinction was criticized by Justice Stevens in his concurrence, id. at 154
n. 4, and by Congress in passing the PDA, see text this page. But the deepest incoherence of the
opinion lies not with its distinction between benefits and burdens, but rather with its inconsistent
treatment of pregnancy as a sex-specific trait. The Court's reasoning may be summarized as follows:
There is no claim of sex discrimination with respect to pregnancy because it is a sex-specific trait;
there is a claim of sex discrimination with respect to pregnancy precisely because it is a sex-specific
trait. A theory of equality that gives coherent recognition to pregnancy as a sex-specific trait has yet to
emerge in the post-amendment period. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
35. The circuits apparently read Salty as authorizing an ad hoc evaluation of pregnancy discrimi-
nation claims, most following Gilbert in rejecting them. Compare Langley v. State Farm & Casualty
Co., 644 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1981) (requirement of immediate notification of pregnancy and
mandatory leave on date determined by physician upheld) and In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
Maternity Benefits Litig., 602 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979) (limitation on seniority accrual upheld) with
Thompson v. Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp. 1035 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (limitation on seniority accrual,
notification and medical verification requirements, and mandatory leave policy constitute prima facie
violations of Title VII), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
36. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 3. By defining policies containing exclusionary preg-
nancy classifications as per se sex-based, the PDA enabled plaintiffs to challenge them on disparate
treatment grounds, where Gilbert and Satty had required they be analyzed in disparate impact terms.
As the House Report observes, the amendment eliminates the need to rely on a disparate impact cause
of action in such instances. It does not, however, eliminate the cause of action itself.
37. Disparate impact claims under the PDA have been recognized in Abraham v. Graphic Arts
Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984), and Miller-Wohl v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., No. 84-172, slip op. (Mont. Dec.
28, 1984); and tentatively considered in Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp.
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D. Misconstruction of the PDA
Courts and commentators who insist on a parity construction of the
PDA3 8 find authority for such an interpretation in the amendment's legis-
lative history39 and in its second clause,"4 both of which contain language
mandating that the pregnant employee be treated the same as others, on
the basis of ability or inability to work. This language is construed restric-
tively, as stating a substantive principle to govern all pregnancy claims
under Title VII."4 Such a restrictive construction of the record ignores the
doctrinal developments to which Congress' endorsement of parity princi-
ples was responsive. It is, moreover, inconsistent with both the language
Congress adopted to amend Title VII and the understanding of preg-
nancy discrimination informing its deliberations.
Congress amended Title VII to repudiate, in unequivocal terms, the
exclusionary pregnancy policies at issue in the Gilbert and Satty cases.
Recognizing that Title VII principles of comparable treatment would
provide full redress to the inequities of such practices, Congress acted to
provide plaintiffs the disparate treatment cause of action twice denied
them by the Court.42 This intent is codified in the PDA's second clause,
which functions specifically to reverse Gilbert.43 However, as the Supreme
206 (E.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) and Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 685 F.2d
1088 (9th Cir. 1982). In the main, however, they have been foreclosed by judicial ratification of
employer defenses based on a parity interpretation of the amendment. See, e.g., Marafino v. St. Louis
County Circuit Court and other cases cited supra note 15. The EEOC identifies parity as the "basic
principle" of the PDA, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1604 app. (1984), but nonetheless maintains a guideline, dating
from 1972, barring leave policies having a disparate impact on pregnant women. See infra note 53.
38. See supra note 15.
39. For example, the House Report states:
[T]his legislation, operating as part of Title VII, prohibits only discriminatory treatment.
Therefore, it does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner
with respect to hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing
medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. H.R. 6075 in
no way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist. The bill
would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees on the
basis of their ability or inability to work.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 4. Accord S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 4. Reassurances
of this order are repeated in the legislative history. See infra note 47.
40. For the relevant text of the PDA, see supra note 3.
41. Such a restrictive construction of the PDA preempts both a disparate impact claim to ade-
quate maternity leave and state laws requiring the provision of such leave. See supra note 21.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 2-3.
43. More specifically, the clause serves to limit the reading of the Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1982), that the Court advanced in support of its holding in Gilbert. See 429 U.S. 125,
143-45 (1976). (The Bennett Amendment exempts from Title VII's proscription of sex-based wage
discrimination pay differentials authorized by the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); the
Court has since ruled that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporates into Title VII the affirmative
defenses of the Equal Pay Act. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).)
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Court has already ruled, this second clause supplements, without limiting,
the statutory definition of "sex" set forth in the PDA's first clause.""
The language of this first clause is vital to any interpretation of the
amendment. By expressly including "pregnancy" within the meaning of
"sex," Congress sought to ensure application of Title VII principles to
pregnancy-related claims on the same basis as all other sex-based claims.
This larger function of the amendment is confirmed by its location in the
definitional provisions of the Act.45 Congress' object in reversing Gilbert
was to restore and affirm the integrity of Title VII principles 46-not to
impose a new limiting principle on the pregnancy discrimination claim.47
Congress acted to provide women raising pregnancy claims the benefits
of full Title VII protection because, unlike the Court, it understood that
pregnancy played a central role in the logic of sex-based employment dis-
crimination. As Congress understood, and the Court did not, "[T]he as-
sumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force
leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the
discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end
44. The Supreme Court adopted this construction of the PDA in Newport News Shipbldg. &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2628 n.14 (1983): "The meaning of the first clause is not
limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the application of the general
principle to women employees." The Supreme Court has yet to construe the PDA with reference to
the claims of women employees; the Newport News case involved the claim of male employees to
maternity-related spousal benefits at levels of coverage equal to those provided female employees.
45. For forceful assertions to this effect, see supra note 25. Had Congress understood its language
reversing Gilbert as sufficient to govern all pregnancy claims, it could have simply inserted the PDA's
second clause into § 703. Congress did not, because it saw itself as affirming Title VII princi-
ples-not altering them.
46. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 29,655 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("What we are doing is
leaving the situation the way it was before the Supreme Court decided the Gilbert case last year.");
124 CONG. REC. 21,436 (1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin) ("This bill would restore the interpreta-
tion of title VII prior to that decision . . ... "); accord S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 7-8. In
Newport News, the Supreme Court characterized Congress' purpose in passing the PDA as follows:
"[A]mending legislation was necessary to reestablish the principles of Title VII law as they had been
understood prior to the Gilbert decision." 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2628 (1983). Title VII affords plaintiffs
both a disparate treatment and a disparate impact cause of action.
47. Doctrinally consistent resolution of the disability benefits issue presented by Gilbert required
no more than comparable treatment. Congressional reassurances to this effect, see supra note 39,
while no doubt helpful in securing the amendment's passage, represent no modification of Title VII
principles. The limiting principles for benefits secured by the amendment's passage inhere in
Title VII proper, and are not imposed by the PDA itself. As the House Report observes, "We recog-
nize that enactment of H.R. 6075 will reflect no new legislative mandate . . . nor effect changes in
practices, costs, or benefits beyond those intended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." H.R. REP.
No. 948, supra note 13, at 3-4.
Congress' preoccupation with parity principles is responsive to the equity issues framed by the
Gilbert case, and must be read in that context. There is simply no indication in the legislative history
of congressional intention to abrogate a disparate impact cause of action for pregnancy discrimination.
Rather, the House Report specifically recognizes its continued existence. See supra p. 936. In addi-
tion, both the House and Senate reports give unqualified endorsement to the EEOC's guidelines on
pregnancy discrimination, which proscribe leave policies having a disparate impact on women, see
infra note 53. H.R. RaP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 2; S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 2.
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jobs."'48 Congress amended Title VII to reverse this cycle of assumptions:
to assert that pregnancy is and must be treated as a normal condition of
employment.49 It saw pregnancy as an integral moment in women's work-
ing lives, and was committed to eliminating employment practices that
cast them in conflict. 50
As it is currently construed, the PDA can only begin to realize Con-
gress' objectives. The requirement of comparable treatment can eliminate
overt expressions of animus toward pregnancy, of the type graphically il-
lustrated by Gilbert. But to the extent the workplace remains organized
on the basis of male norms, a standard of comparable treatment will in
fact perpetuate pregnancy-based exclusions.51 It is here that a disparate
impact cause of action can play its intended role, scrutinizing employment
practices for their latent exclusionary bias. Facially neutral rules that ex-
clude "because of or on the basis of pregnancy," 5' 2 are in prima facie vio-
lation of Title VII as amended. Recognition of disparate impact claims
under the PDA is essential if the amendment is to realize its primary
48. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 3; cf. 124 CONG. REC. 21, 440-41 (1978) (statement of
Rep. LaFalce) (Gilbert reinforced "outdated argument that women depend on men, and not their
jobs, for support").
49. Because analysis of the record to date has tended to focus on the parity principles by which
Congress rectified the Court's reasoning in Gilbert, the concerns motivating its extraordinary decision
to reverse the Court are frequently overlooked. First among them was the Court's failure to discern
the sexual ideology underlying pregnancy discrimination. Congress recognized that the exclusionary
treatment of pregnancy expressed a social judgment that woman's reproductive capacity defined and
limited her employment capacities, and was, therefore, part of a sexual code implicating all women. It
understood that, as a practical matter, securing employment equality for women would require chal-
lenging this complex of attitudes at its core. Changing the status of the pregnant employee was
deemed essential to changing the employment status of women generally. Senator Williams, Senate
sponsor of the PDA, reviewed the sexual disparity in earnings nationwide, observing:
These shocking statistics cannot be made better unless working women are provided effective
protection against discrimination on the basis of their childbearing capacity. Testimony...
has shown that most policies and practices of discrimination against women in the workforce
result from attitudes about pregnancy and the role of women who become pregnant which are
inconsistent with the full participation of women in our economic system.
Because of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been viewed as marginal workers
not deserving the full benefits of compensation and advancement granted to other workers.
123 CONG. REc. 29,385 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams). Only when pregnancy is treated as a
normal condition of employment will women secure employment equality. It is this vision that informs
the PDA's passage. Accord Furnish, supra note 15, at 84 ("The fact that pregnancy is a normal
occurrence in the working life of female employees was a basic premise of section 701(k).").
50. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 21,442 (1978) (statement of Rep. Myers) ("The right of women to
work and their right to bear children cannot be considered mutually exclusive.... It is time that
* . .women are commended for their dual contribution to our society and not penalized for it."); 124
CONG. REC. 21,439 (1978) (statement of Rep. Corrada) (bill will facilitate women's choice to bear
children without facing economic hardship); accord 124 CONG. REC. 21,440 (1978) (statement of
Rep. LaFalce); see also Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 956 n.19 (D.S.C. 1980) (PDA "fore-
closes the possibility that women would have to choose between a role as wage earner or a role as
mother"), affd in part, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
51. See supra note 17.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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objective: securing a workplace in which pregnancy is, and is treated as, a
normal condition of employment.
II. THE DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM OF PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION
Two facially neutral practices having an exclusionary impact on the
pregnant employee, inadequate leave policies and inflexible job defini-
tions, illustrate the role of disparate impact analysis under the PDA. The
discussion of leave policies will examine the equality claim underlying
pregnancy discrimination challenges to workplace norms. The discussion
of job definitions considers a conjunctive use of disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims to secure workplace accommodation of pregnancy
under the PDA.
A. The Claim to Adequate Leave
Since 1972, the EEOC has proscribed leave policies having a disparate
impact on pregnant women.53 Under the PDA, however, courts have re-
peatedly dismissed challenges to leave policies inadequate for childbearing
on the grounds that they afford employees comparable treatment.5" Only
two courts have definitively rejected this limiting construction of the
amendment. In Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union,5 the
D.C. Circuit asserted: "An employer can incur a Title VII violation as
much by lack of an adequate leave policy as by unequal application of a
policy it does have."5" Plaintiff, fired when her maternity leave exceeded
the maximum of ten days leave designated for her position, was held to
53. Codified under a section heading entitled "Employment policies relating to pregnancy and
childbirth," the guideline states: "Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled
is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termina-
tion violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by
business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1984).
The period of leave required for purposes of childbearing is normally no more than six weeks. See
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 5. It is to be distinguished from leave for childcare purposes,
see supra note 6.
54. See, e.g., Conners v. University of Tenn. Press, 558 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Brown-
Weathersby v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, No. 82-C-2351, slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1983); cf. Marafino v.
St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (refusal to hire on the basis of
pregnancy upheld where employer would have treated other applicants requesting leave similarly, and
where plaintiff failed to prove prima facie case of disparate impact), affd, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.
1983). For additional authority adverse to the claim, see infra note 60.
55. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 819. The D.C. Circuit observed that while a policy setting maximum leave at ten days
might be adequate for the needs of most male and female employees holding the job, "any such
jobholder confronted by childbirth was doomed to almost certain termination. Oncoming motherhood
was virtually tantamount to dismissal. . . .In short, the ten-day absolute ceiling on disability leave
portended a drastic effect on women employees of childbearing age-an impact no male would ever
encounter." Id.
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have established a prima facie case of disparate impact. 7 Following Abra-
ham's reasoning, the Supreme Court of Montana held that a state law
requiring adequate maternity leave was not preempted by the PDA, as
both laws proscribed leave policies having a disparate impact on pregnant
women.
58
The unsympathetic reception accorded the claim to adequate leave can-
not simply be ascribed to the prevailing construction of the amendment. It
is urged that the pregnant employee has no greater claim to an adequate
leave policy than does any other employee facing temporary disability.59
Recognizing the claim to adequate maternity leave is held to constitute
preferential treatment or reverse discrimination: "Discrimination against
males based on pregnancy." 6°
The "preference" entailed in recognizing the claim to adequate mater-
nity leave has yet to receive critical examination. Were the claim to ade-
quate leave recognized, men and women would remain equally unpro-
tected as to all non-reproductive disabilities.6 ' In other words, recognizing
the claim creates no sex-based class of "dispreferred," hence effects no
sex-based injury. To dismiss the claim to adequate maternity leave on
grounds of preference, one must have an equitable objection to accommo-
dating a function specific to women, for which there is no male
correlative.62
57. Sumary judgment was thus denied, and the case remanded for an adjudication of the em-
ployer's defense, that exigencies of the project in which plaintiff was employed (particularly its short
term duration) necessitated the challenged leave policy. For a discussion of the prima facie case and
business necessity defense under the PDA, see infra Part III.
58. The court did not rely on Abraham's reasoning alone. It reasoned from the text of the PDA
itself-
[T]he discharge from her employment of a woman for her pregnancy, without more, is an
unlawful practice under Title VII and the PDA. It is a gender-based discrimination. The
discharged pregnant woman is not treated the same for all employment-related purposes as all
other persons not so affected, obviously, because men cannot be discharged for the same reason.
The intent of Title VII and the PDA that women should be treated equally with men on
matters of employment means that women cannot be discharged simply because they are
pregnant.
Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., No. 84-172, slip op. at 18 (Mont. Dec. 28,
1984). For discussion of the preemption controversy, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. See Williams, supra note 15, at 196.
60. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562, 568
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (discussed supra note 21); see also Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor &
Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed supra
note 21); Brown-Weathersby v. Seaway Nat'l Bank, No. 82-C-2351, slip op. (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1983)
("[PDA] does not mandate affirmative or special maternity leave policies."); cf. Fields v. Bolger, 723
F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (discussed infra note 68).
61. The class of disabilities unprotected by the claim to adequate leave would include those affect-
ing reproductive organs specific to each sex, e.g., conditions requiring hysterectomy, mastectomy,
prostatectomy.
62. As the Supreme Court objected in the pre-amendment period, providing benefits for preg-
nancy comparable to those afforded non-reproductive disabilities would confer on women "a benefit
that men cannot and do not receive." Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977). Ironi-
cally, the parity standard is now defended on the very grounds on which the Court rejected it in the
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Isolating the legitimate content of the preference objection reveals the
fallacy of its central premise. The notion of "preferring" pregnancy to
other disabling conditions of employment presupposes a commonality be-
tween them that does not obtain, either as a matter of scientific or social
understanding. Fundamentally, pregnancy is neither a disability nor a
dysfunction, but a normal moment in the human reproductive process spe-
cific to women. It is, moreover, a biological difference central to the defi-
nition of gender roles, one traditionally believed to render women unfit for
employment.6 3 In denying the biological and social specificity of preg-
nancy, the preference objection obscures the basis of the claim to mater-
nity leave itself.
Leave policies inadequate for childbearing are appropriately challenged
under Title VII as they effect sex-based harm. Leave policies that define
normal conditions of employment in terms inadequate to accommodate
pregnancy define pregnancy as incompatible with employment.6 4 Such
policies do not merely embody normative assumptions about the sexes;
they perpetuate them.65 By withholding the most elemental measure of job
pre-amendment period. By Satty's reasoning, the sex-specificity of pregnancy disentitled women to
comparable treatment; under the prevailing interpretation of the amendment, the sex-specificity of
pregnancy compels comparable treatment.
Only one court has unequivocally repudiated the preferential treatment objection to provision of
adequate maternity leave under the PDA-criticizing those raising preference objections for their
failure to recognize pregnancy as a sex-specific trait. See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor
& Indus., No. 84-172, slip op. at 23 (Mont. Dec. 28, 1984) (quoting Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (D. Mont. 1981)).
63. It should be recalled that, until the passage of the PDA, there existed no compelling social
analogue between pregnancy and other disabilities. Comprehensive disability benefit plans regularly
provided coverage for all forms of employment disabilities-with the sole exception of pregnancy. See
Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and
H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The singular, exclusionary treatment accorded pregnancy in
the disability benefits context was typical of many other employment practices during this period, see
supra note 16. At the same time pregnancy was excluded from state unemployment insurance cover-
age, on the presumption that the pregnant woman was no longer an active candidate in the labor
market-a statutory presumption that prevailed until prohibited by federal law. See Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982) (no person shall be denied unemployment com-
pensation by state law solely on the basis of pregnancy). See generally Brown v. Porcher, 502 F.
Supp. 946, 956 n.19 (D.S.C. 1980) (Civil Rights Act and Federal Unemployment Tax Act amended
to resolve conflicts between pregnancy and employment), affd in part, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
64. There is nothing natural in the design of a leave policy that neglects to provide for the contin-
gency of pregnancy. Seventy-five countries, including many developing countries and every industrial-
ized country except the United States, provide some form of statutory maternity leave or parental
benefit (insuring all or part of lost wages and health costs associated with pregnancy). Sixteen coun-
tries that do not have national health insurance nevertheless provide statutory maternity leaves.
S. KAMERMAN, supra note 7, at 15.
65. An exclusion on the basis of pregnancy has powerful normative implications for the employee.
It confirms that she belongs at home rather than at work, that her status as an employee is
subordinate to her role as a mother. A new mother, faced by job loss, is likely to accept the societal
judgment implicit in her exclusion and remain at home, particularly when the alternative-searching
for a new job, with no income for childcare-is fraught with difficulties. The exclusion of a pregnant
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security from women who would bear children as economically autono-
mous, rather than dependent, persons," such leave policies penalize any
woman who defies conventional sex roles. Such policies reinforce, for em-
ployer and employee alike, the assumption that a woman's reproductive
role defines and limits her productive role.67 The plaintiff challenging an
inadequate leave policy does not seek "preferential treatment"; rather, she
seeks recognition-in the most limited of terms-that parenting is compat-
ible with employment, for women as well as men.
B. Challenging Inflexible Job Definitions
A second employment practice susceptible to disparate impact challenge
under the PDA is the inflexible job description. An employer may define
a job in such a way that pregnant employees in general good health are
unable to perform some of its tasks 6 -- or are deemed so by the em-
ployer."9 The employer who requires that an employee meet all qualifica-
tions in a particular job description, without exploring such modifications
employee is thus likely to result in a lengthy disruption of her labor force participation, with long-
term effects on her employment status and earning capacity. See S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 6
("[Exclusionary pregnancy] policies have long-term effects on the careers of women and account in
large part for the fact that women remain today primarily in low-paying, dead-end jobs.").
66. In 1960, 27% of married women were in the labor force; by 1982, that figure had risen to
56%. The employment rate for single mothers (unmarried, divorced, and widowed) has risen from
59% in 1970 to 67.7% in 1982. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 7, at 7. Between 1977 and 1982, labor
force participation for mothers of children under one year of age increased from 32% to 42%. Id. at
12.
67. As long as leave policies remain inadequate for childbearing, and thus result in pregnancy-
based terminations, women's transient employment status must continue to factor in the daily calcula-
tions of employer and employee alike. Such policies thereby implicate women's employability as a
class.
68. An example is provided by the recent case of Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984).
There a postal service mail handler early in the term of her pregnancy informed her supervisor that
she could lift only 35-40 pounds in weight. Because mail handlers of her job classification were
defined as capable of lifting 70 pounds in weight, the court sustained the post office in its decision to
place her on unpaid leave.
The job description at issue in Bolger is susceptible to disparate impact challenge. Accommodation
is likely to prove feasible where, as here, the job description defines the maximum, rather than typical,
exertion required for the job. The feasibility of modifying job tasks in this instance is confirmed by the
fact that the employer in Bolger provided alternate light duty assignments for employees injured on
the job, although such assignments were not guaranteed to employees temporarily disabled for other
cause. It was, however, the existence of this policy that led the Sixth Circuit to sustain the exclusion:
"Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to prefer for alternative employment an employee who,
because of pregnancy, is unable to perform her full range of duties." 723 F.2d at 1220. (While the
case was decided under pre-amendment law, a court committed to a parity interpretation of the PDA
would have reached the same result, Compare, however, the EEOC's position, discussed infra note
70.)
69. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (pregnancy dis-
qualifies women for position of radiologist on fetal hazards grounds); Harriss v. Pan American World
Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (pregnancy incompatible with position of flight attendant on
customer safety grounds).
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or recombinations of tasks and duties as would enable a generally fit preg-
nant employee to continue working, will force her into premature leave,
or unemployment. The failure to explore feasible accommodations does
not appear as an exclusion of the pregnant employee from the work-
place-but it operates in practice to that effect."
Job definitions most urgently require disparate impact analysis in those
instances where an employer determines that pregnancy disqualifies
women for employment. Under the PDA, courts continue to ratify
pregnancy-specific exclusions on customer safety 71 and fetal hazards
grounds.7 2 For example, in Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, 3
the Ninth Circuit upheld a "stop work" policy requiring pregnant em-
ployees to put themselves on unpaid maternity leave within twenty-four
hours of learning of pregnancy (with failure to comply considered a "vol-
untary resignation").74 The court accepted the customer safety rationale
advanced by the airline without rigorously analyzing it in accordance with
parity principles. 5 At no point did it consider whether restructuring
plaintiffs' job tasks to include ground functions might have satisfied the
employer's alleged safety concerns, 8 with less injury to its predominantly
70. The series of questions and answers developed by the EEOC to guide implementation of the
PDA strictly applies parity principles, equivocating only with respect to the question of job modifica-
tion. Question 5 asserts that an employer must modify job tasks for the pregnant employee in need of
accommodation to the same extent that an employer would for employees disabled for other cause.
Question 12, however, departs from comparative analysis. In discussing the obligation of an employer
to hire a pregnant applicant medically unable to perform all of a job's tasks, the EEOC asserts: "An
employer cannot refuse to hire a women [sic] because of her pregnancy-related condition so long as
she is able to perform the major functions necessary to do the job." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1604 app. (1984)
(emphasis added). This is the Commission's sole departure from parity concepts in the 37 questions it
answers.
71. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan American World
Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
72. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
73. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 673, 676-77. Plaintiffs challenged two additional elements of the policy, a "start work"
rule forbidding employees to return to work until 60 days after delivery, and a rule denying accrual of
seniority after the first 90 days of leave. Both claims were remanded for further consideration.
75. But see id. at 679 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (fact that Pan American regulated employment
fitness of flight attendants only with respect to risks of pregnancy, and no other physical disability,
undermines persuasiveness of customer safety rationale).
76. Although courts have consistently sustained pregnancy "stop work" policies such as Pan
American's on customer safety grounds, see, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1984); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965
(1981), there is good reason to presume the airlines have acted out of concern for their (male) passen-
gers' supposed sexual satisfaction rather than safety. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (female "sex appeal" not bona fide occupational qualification for job of
flight attendant, even where airline advertises its services through "love" campaign). Until barred by
Title VII, the airlines originally hired only female flight attendants, and defended this policy on the
basis of "customer preference." See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.)
(superior performance of female flight attendants in providing "personalized service and, in. . . mak-
ing flights . . . pleasurable" insufficient to constitute a bona fide occupational qualification), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). They hired young single women, automatically dismissing any flight
attendant who married. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
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female workforce."
Where, as in Harriss, an employer alleges pregnancy-specific reasons
for an exclusionary policy, the inflexible job description supporting the
policy can be challenged by advancing disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims in the alternative. If an employer defeats plaintiffs' dispa-
rate treatment claim by proving sex a bona fide occupational qualification
("bfoq") 78 for the job as defined, plaintiffs can then challenge the job defi-
nition supporting the exclusion on disparate impact grounds. 9
Such a conjunctive use of disparate treatment and disparate impact doc-
trine was recently authorized by the Eleventh Circuit in Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hospital."0 There an employer fired a radiologist in her second
month of pregnancy, claiming that her job posed a risk of fetal harm
which justified the exclusion. The Hayes court ruled that an employer
seeking to exclude a pregnant woman pursuant to a fetal hazards policy"1
U.S. 991 (1971).
To date only one court has acknowledged the underlying sexual logic of the airlines' maternity
policies, its findings reversed on appeal. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 458 F. Supp. 474, 499-502
(E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). In
the main, courts have declared the airlines' "preference" for women to immunize them from allega-
tions of sex discrimination, see infra note 104, and have explicitly refused to take legal cognizance of
the larger design of the airlines' employment practices in evaluating pregnancy discrimination claims,
see EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, 485 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
77. The experience of Delta Air Lines suggests the feasibility of such an arrangement. Delta
originally held either pregnancy or marriage to be grounds for firing. Subsequently, it adopted an
unpaid leave policy containing "stop work" provisions similar to Pan American's, which it replaced,
of its own accord, in 1974 with a policy permitting pregnant flight attendants to transfer to ground
positions. See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1984). Despite Delta's own
demonstration of its capacity to accommodate the pregnant employees it deemed unfit to fly, its "stop
work" policy was held not to violate Title VII. Id. at 1001-02.
78. Sex-based employment policies can be defended only on the grounds that sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification (bfoq) for the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). According to the
Supreme Court, the bfoq defense is to remain "an extremely narrow exception" to Title VII's prohi-
bition against sex-based employment decisionmaking. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334
(1977). In the pregnancy context, the defense would require that an employer meet high standards of
proof that pregnancy peculiarly disqualified "all or substantially all women" for employment, in a
fashion distinct from other (non-sex-linked) physical conditions. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
79. This is precisely what makes recognition of disparate impact claims significant in such litiga-
tion. The bfoq defense presumes the integrity of a particular job description; the disparate impact
claim entitles plaintiffs to challenge it.
80. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
81. The leading article on fetal hazards regulation under the PDA is Williams, Firing the Wo-
man to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity
Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981). As Williams' review of the scientific literature
suggests, toxic substances can affect the normal development of the fetus (a) prior to conception, by
damaging male or female reproductive cells, or (b) subsequent to conception, acting directly upon the
fetus in utero. Id. at 655-60. Thus, fetal hazards regulation directed exclusively at women may be
premised on traditional assumptions concerning woman's primary reproductive role, rather than a
scientific understanding of the basis of fetal injury. Id. at 660-61. Williams argues that policies di-
rected exclusively at women can survive Title VII analysis only if shown to be "neutral" in their
objective of protecting employee offspring, i.e., that the workplace in fact poses no risk to the offspring
of male employees. Id. at 687-88.
Commentators dissenting from Williams' analysis argue that no sex-based fetal hazard policy can
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was first required to prove the risk sex-based in fact.82 Were such a de-
fense successfully established, the question of Title VII liability would
not be resolved, but reframed. The policy's exclusive effect on women pro-
vided "the employee ... an automatic prima facie case of disparate
impact."83
Once the underlying disparate impact claim is recognized, Title VII
doctrine allows employers to defend the challenged practice as a business
necessity. Plaintiffs, however, may rebut this defense by demonstrating
less exclusionary means of implementing the employer's policy.84 Thus,
consistent with Title VII precedent, Hayes held that plaintiff was entitled
to demonstrate that job restructuring constituted an alternate method of
minimizing fetal risk having a lesser exclusionary impact on pregnant em-
ployees.8 5 As the Hayes court recognized, disparate impact doctrine im-
poses a duty of reasonable accommodation upon the employer-one of
heightened significance in view of pregnancy's historic exclusion from the
workplace.88
survive scrutiny under Title VII, as amended. An employment policy that expressly excludes on the
basis of sex (or pregnancy) is sex-based, regardless of its objectives; and all defenses to sex-based
employment policies under the Act concern job performance and customer safety-not fetal risk. See,
e.g., Furnish, supra note 15; Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the
Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1981).
82. 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984).
83. Id. at 1552. The court's derivation of the disparate impact claim is worthy of closer scrutiny.
Following Williams, supra note 81, the court adopted an expansive definition of a neutral employ-
ment policy. It deemed a sex-based policy "neutral" where an employer could show that workplace
hazards required only the regulation of women's employment in order to provide equal protection to
the offspring of all employees. Id. at 1548. This showing of "neutrality" is the functional equivalent
of a bfoq defense (the employer justifies use of sex-based employment criteria by proving they serve
sex-neutral policy objectives), with one critical distinction: Once the employer proves the disputed
policy "neutral," plaintiffs are entitled to challenge it on disparate impact grounds. The net effect of
the analytical framework adopted in Hayes is to allow plaintiffs to challenge fetal hazards policies by
advancing disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in the alternative.
84. For a discussion of the business necessity doctrine under the PDA, see infra Part III.
85. Less exclusionary alternatives discussed by the Hayes court included (a) assigning plaintiff
other duties within the hospital and (b) rearranging plaintiff's duties within her own department. 726
F.2d at 1553-54. Courts have held disparate impact doctrine to require evaluation of less exclusionary
alternatives in two similar cases governed by pre-amendment law. Fancher v. Veterans Admin. Medi-
cal Center, 507 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (temporary reassignment); Zuniga v. Kleburg County
Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (temporary leave of absence).
In recognizing plaintiff's underlying disparate impact claim, the Eleventh Circuit established a pre-
cedent whose significance may be appreciated in light of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Levin v. Delta
Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff flight attendants in the Levin case were excluded
from employment during the full term of pregnancy, in accordance with an airline "stop work" pol-
icy. The Levin court ruled that once the airline made out its bfoq defense on customer safety grounds,
"it would be unreasonable to place on it the burden of taking extraordinary measures to cushion the
blow for affected employees," 730 F.2d at 1001, even though Delta's subsequent adoption of a policy
providing alternate ground duty assignments had proven the feasibility of job restructuring.
86. The Hayes court summarized the implications of its decision: "[T]o avoid Title VII liability
for a fetal protection policy, an employer must adopt the most effective policy available, with the least
discriminatory impact possible. To require any less would be to return to the days of Muller v.
Oregon." 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (lth Cir. 1984). The Hayes court is thus the first to recognize the
historical basis of pregnancy discrimination, and its relevance to the adjudication of claims under the
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III. LITIGATING A DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM
The pregnancy discrimination challenge to exclusionary leave policies
or job definition practices rests on traditional Title VII principles. In ap-
plying these principles courts must nonetheless ensure that disparate im-
pact litigation under the PDA remains responsive to the logic of the preg-
nancy discrimination claim.
A. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the PDA,
plaintiffs must demonstrate the impact of a challenged practice on the
class of pregnant women, rather than women generally. 87 Demonstrating
impact in this fashion is consistent with the amendment's first clause,
which provides that a practice that excludes "because of or on the basis of
pregnancy"88 excludes on the basis of sex. It is, furthermore, consistent
with the understanding of pregnancy discrimination that informed Con-
gress' decision to amend Title VII. 9 All women are implicated in the
exclusion of the pregnant employee;90 the pregnant woman therefore rep-
resents the class for disparate impact purposes.
Demonstrating the impact of a particular job definition or leave policy
on an individual pregnant employee may, however, be insufficient to es-
tablish disparate impact for Title VII purposes. Because the disparate
impact claim is one defined with reference to group membership,9 plain-
tiff's prima facie case must establish that the challenged practice embodies
PDA. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
87. The Court's application of disparate impact doctrine in the pre-amendment period demon-
strates the practical significance of this analytical distinction. In Gilbert, the Court suggested that the
impact of a practice excluding on the basis of pregnancy required evaluation with respect to women as
a class, thereby diffusing its legally cognizable effects. See 429 U.S. at 137-40 ("no proof that the
package is in fact worth more to men than to women"). In Satty, however, the Court focused specifi-
cally on the practice's impact on pregnant women. See 434 U.S. at 142 (employer may not "deprive
[women] of employment opportunities because of their different role"); see also id. at 144 (holding in
Gilbert "did not depend on . . .evidence" of plan's value to women as a class). The D.C. Circuit in
Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981), quoted supra note 56, has
adapted Satty's approach to PDA disparate impact claims, as has the Supreme Court of Montana, see
supra note 58, An analytical framework modeled after Gilbert was, however, suggested in Marafino
v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D. Mo. 1982), afftd, 707 F.2d 1005
(8th Cir. 1983).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
90. Most obviously, the situation of the pregnant employee is representative of that of all other
female employees, when pregnant. Just as importantly, policies affecting pregnant employees will
ultimately affect the status of all women in the workplace. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977) (state-
ment of Sen. Williams) ("[Tihe overall effect of discrimination against women because they might
become pregnant, or do become pregnant, is to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in
particular, to a second-class status with regard to career advancement and continuity of employment
and wages.").
91. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 582 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part);
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a norm likely to have an exclusionary impact on pregnant women as a
class.92 This determination in some instances may be made as a matter of
judicial notice;9" but in others will require the development of new eviden-
tiary standards for disparate impact purposes.9 4
B. The Business Necessity Defense
Under Title VII, an employer is entitled to rebut plaintiff's prima facie
case by demonstrating business necessities-considerations of safety or ef-
ficiency-that justify a challenged practice despite its exclusionary im-
pact.95 Plaintiffs then have the opportunity to identify less exclusionary
means by which an employer might effectuate the claimed business pur-
poses.9" Litigation of defenses to disparate impact claims will therefore
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 457 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1324 (1984). The requirement of class impact does not, how-
ever, operate to preclude claims brought by individual plaintiffs, where proof of group impact can be
determined as a matter of judicial notice or general statistical inference. See Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 585 n.7 (4th Cir.) (requiring statistical proof involving significant sample of
actual applications of policy would always preclude the claim of first "impactee," and may be inap-
propriate where individual brings disparate impact claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979). The
cases cited infra note 93 suggest the frequency with which disparate impact claims are raised by
individual plaintiffs.
92. In practice, such a requirement will select as a workplace norm the exigencies of a pregnancy
without significant medical complication.
93. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977); Abraham v. Graphics Art
Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977);
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 585 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979).
But cf. Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court, 537 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (court
"cannot simply imagine a disparate impact"), affd, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
94. In developing a prima facie case, plaintiffs could introduce into evidence such relevant statis-
tics as may be available from government, medical, or other expert sources, much as one establishes
proof of exclusionary impact in other disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (statistics documenting aggregate height-weight differences on basis of sex na-
tionally); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (census figures).
95. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) ("[A] discriminatory employment
practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII
challenge."); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (widely-cited elaboration of this
standard), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
The "job-relatedness" test employed by courts to scrutinize applicant testing procedures would ap-
pear to be an inappropriate formulation of the business necessity doctrine in other contexts. In the
applicant testing context it functions as a "rigorous standard," Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
247 (1976); in any other context "job-relatedness" is a vague standard, easily invoked to ratify ex-
isting employment practices. The better approach would be to scrutinize a challenged practice in light
of the core values of safety and efficiency upon which business necessity doctrine rests. See Williams,
supra note 81, at 689-93.
96. The Supreme Court formulated the terms of plaintiffs' rebuttal in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975), a case involving a disparate impact challenge to applicant testing
procedures: "If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job-related,' it
remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trusty
workmanship."' The Sixth Circuit has outlined evidence that a court should consider in evaluating
the merits of plaintiffs' rebuttal:
Certainly any subsequent practices adopted by the company would be relevant. The hiring
policies of comparable businesses might also shed some light on what constitutes a feasible
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focus on two considerations: the cost of alternate practices, and the in-
fringement on management prerogatives entailed in implementing them.
Business necessity doctrine recognizes cost as a legitimate, but not dis-
positive, factor in the evaluation of employer defenses.97 The presumption
against defenses based on cost per se should assume particularly strong
form under the PDA. Congress' action in amending Title VII-reversing
an industry-wide practice of exempting pregnancy from disability benefits
coverage-evidences a clear commitment to this principle in the pregnancy
context.98 Where an employer raises cost objections to the adoption of al-
ternate practices, standard business practice with respect to the accommo-
dation of non-reproductive disabilities should provide a reasonable bench-
mark for evaluating the defense.9
Although rarely described as such, plaintiff's rebuttal to the employer's
business necessity defense imposes a duty of reasonable accommodation on
the employer, 10 a duty which cannot be avoided by simple invocation of
management prerogative. As courts evaluate the less exclusionary alterna-
tives plaintiffs have suggested, they must establish reasonable parameters
of accommodation in accordance with the larger mandate of the PDA:
that pregnancy is presumptively a normal condition of employment. 10'
alternative. Of course, the marginal cost of another hiring policy and its implications for public
safety are factors which should not be omitted from consideration.
Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981).
97. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.) (in "determining the exis-
tence of business necessity, dollar cost alone is not determinative"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971); cf. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (loss of com-
petitive advantage does not constitute business necessity insofar as it would limit Title VII coverage to
financially successful enterprises); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 532-33 (E.D. Tex.
1974) ("expense involved in changing from a discriminatory system" does not constitute "business
necessity that would justify the continuation of. . . discrimination").
98. Congress received extensive testimony on the cost of including pregnancy in disability benefits
programs, with estimates varying by as much as 400%. The House adopted an estimate of almost 200
million dollars. H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 13, at 9. The Senate Report, acknowledging the
difficulties of ascertaining cost projections, nonetheless asserts "even a very high cost could not justify
continuation of the policy of discrimination against pregnant women which has played such a major
part in the pattern of sex discrimination in this country." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 13, at 11. See
also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984) (where fetal
hazard policy is challenged under PDA, business necessity defense allowed on grounds of safety, not
cost of potential liability).
99. Cf Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir. 1981) (policies of
comparable businesses may "shed . . . light on what constitutes a feasible alternative"). Reference to
standard business practice outside the pregnancy context should eliminate the bias that commonly
informs thinking about pregnancy in the workplace. Cost concerns should, moreover, be evaluated in
light of the presumption that all industry competitors are in compliance with statutory mandate. Cf
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
100. This duty of reasonable accommodation is implicit in the terms of plaintiffs' rebuttal, see
supra note 96. It finds practical illustration in the Abraham and Hayes cases, discussed supra Part II.
Frug, supra note 6, at 71, has suggested that the issue of feasible accommodations is the crux of the
business necessity defense: "Alternative practices must be usable in lieu of the challenged practice for
the plaintiffs to succeed in their case; conversely, alternative practices must not be available for an
employer to succeed in his defense."
101. See supra note 49. It is impossible to state a per se rule to guide courts in determining the
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IV. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION IN THE SEX SEGREGATED
WORKPLACE
The American workforce remains sexually segregated. Half of all
working women work in occupations that are over 70% female; more than
one-quarter work in jobs that are 95% or more female. 10 2 Although
Title VII doctrine has enabled women to challenge their exclusion from
male-dominated job categories, it has proven less effective in combatting
the sex discrimination faced by women who remain isolated in tradition-
ally "female" occupations.
Litigation of comparable worth claims is now focusing attention on sex-
based pay discrimination as it operates within the female-dominated job
category. 0 3 Pregnancy discrimination in the female-dominated job cate-
gory requires similar scrutiny. Although courts applying pre-amendment
scope of reasonable accommodation. Where plaintiff shows that alternate, less exclusionary practices
are readily available, the employer's business necessity objections are sometimes characterized as a
"pretext" for discrimination. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975);
Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs, however, are not required to
prove the employer's objections pretextual, but cf. Levin, 730 F.2d at 1001, as proof of intent is
irrelevant to disparate impact litigation, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The disparate impact inquiry is better conceptualized in the following
terms: Have prevailing societal norms resulted in the adoption or maintenance of exclusionary prac-
tices, or in an indifference to their exclusionary impact? Where feasible alternatives are available,
their existence illuminates latent social bias. For analysis of the claim in similarly socio-historical
terms, see Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984) (pregnancy);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (race).
102. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers, 6 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 19, 22 n.7 (1980). It has been estimated that, for 1976, about two-thirds of nonminority
women would have had to change occupations in order to achieve an occupational distribution identi-
cal with that of nonminority males; figures ranged higher for minority women. U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 42 (1978).
Sex segregation by occupation remained at constant levels during the period 1900-1960, and in
1960 exceeded the degree of job segregation by race. Gross, Plus Ca Change. . .? The Sexual Struc-
ture of Occupations Over Time, 16 Soc. PROBS. 198, 202 (1968). Although women have moved into
male dominated occupations over the century (e.g. manufacture and banking), "the tendency . . . has
been for men to move out. . . thus reconstituting the segregation." C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 424 (1984); accord J.
MATTHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA: WOMEN'S WORK, THE SEXUAL DI-
VISION OF LABOR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM 218 & n.58 (1982). A particularly
pointed example is provided by the feminization of clerical work. See id. at 220-23.
103. While traditional pay discrimination claims have entailed comparison of wages paid to em-
ployees performing the same or substantially similar work, the comparable worth theory seeks to
prove pay discrimination by establishing that male and female employees performing jobs of different
content are nonetheless performing work of "comparable worth" to their employers, despite the pay
differential between them (e.g. "light" custodian, "general" custodian; secretary, truck driver). In
pure form, a plaintiff attempting to prove a comparable worth claim would submit a job evaluation
study (of the type commonly used by large employers) to establish that pay differentials between
"male" and "female" job classifications were traceable to sex discrimination rather than job worth.
However, most cases litigated to date have involved claims that an employer knowingly deviated from
the terms of its own job evaluation study in setting wage rates for male- and female-dominated job
classifications. See generally BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE: A BNA
SPECIAL REPORT (Nov. 7, 1981).
The Supreme Court has held that, under Title VII, women in a female-dominated job classifica-
tion may raise claims of wage discrimination, even where the absence of men performing substantially
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law have viewed the claim with skepticism,"" under the amendment it
warrants reevaluation. Prevailing parity principles should enable women
to challenge overt exclusions on the basis of pregnancy, regardless of their
numbers in the workplace. It remains to be determined whether, under
the PDA, women in a female-dominated job category can raise a disparate
impact challenge to facially neutral practices that exclude on the basis of
pregnancy.
Women should not be denied the benefits of full statutory protection
because of their segregation in the workplace. The sexual stratification of
the American workforce is neither accidental, nor the simple expression of
conventional role preferences. Throughout the century sex segregation in
employment was both precipitated and exacerbated by public and private
regulation-frequently justified with reference to women's reproductive
role.' 5 The assumption that pregnancy is incompatible with employment
remains fiercest in precisely those sectors of the workforce where women
similar work would preclude proof of discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1982). County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Court, however, specifically
reserved the question of whether such a pay discrimination claim required a showing of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 166, 180-81. The lower courts have moved cautiously in recognizing claims of
comparable worth, absent some showing of intentional discrimination. See, e.g., AFSOME v. Wash-
ington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (pay structure of state employment system violated
Title VII on disparate treatment and disparate impact grounds, where state's own job evaluation
study showed women consistently underpaid); Taylor v. Charley Bros., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (where employer was found intentionally to have segregated assembly
jobs by sex, job evaluation constituted admissible evidence to prove wage discrimination in violation of
Title VII); cf Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.) (where no intentional
discrimination proven, showing of wage disparity between comparable jobs insufficient to establish
prima facie case of disparate impact), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984).
104. The fact that an employer hired only women has been held to bar disparate impact claims of
pregnancy discrimination under pre-amendment law. See, e.g., EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, 485 F.
Supp. 1004, 1007 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (because airline policy of terminating pregnant flight attendants
overlapped period when airline hired only female flight attendants, termination policy "was discrimi-
nation against pregnancy but was not and could not be sexual discrimination against women"); James
v. Delta Air Lines, 571 F.2d 1376, 1377-78 (5th Cir.) (no sex discrimination in policy imposing
seniority forfeiture on pregnant flight attendants where airline hired no male flight attendants), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978). Courts have dismissed pregnancy discrimination claims raised by
women in female job categories by defining sex discrimination narrowly, as requiring a preference
between similarly situated men and women, or by requiring such an instance of comparative prefer-
ence as evidence of discrimination. The underlying objection to recognizing such claims would seem to
be that an employer of an all-female workforce has evidenced a "preference" for women, rather than
an exclusionary animus toward them. Similar objections have been raised in a case litigated under the
PDA. See Harvey v. YWCA, 533 F. Supp. 949, 954 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (where directors and nearly
all employees were female, court found it difficult to see how plaintiffs could establish sex discrimina-
tion). However, the sex-composition of plaintiff's job classification played no role in the determination
of impact in either the Abraham or Hayes cases, discussed supra Part II.
105. For a discussion of this pronatalist regulatory tradition, see infra notes 110-11 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of its role in exacerbating job segregation, see W. CHAFE, THE AMERI-
CAN WOMAN 124-25 (1972); C. DEGLER, supra note 102, at 401-04; A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO
WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNrIED STATES 193-95 (1982). Kessler-
Harris documents organized labor's advocacy of pronatalist regulation of women's employment to
protect male jobs and wages. Id. at 201-05.
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have been segregated.106 The sex segregation of the workplace should not
be invoked to bar disparate impact claims under the PDA when it is the
product of attitudes and practices it is the object of Title VII to proscribe.
Where an employer of a predominantly female workforce adopts "neu-
tral" policies that exclude on the basis of pregnancy, the impact of such
policies can be discerned, not in the aggregate number of women hired,
but in the rate of employee turnover. The foreseeable impact of such prac-
tices illuminates their implicit sexual premise: that woman's labor force
participation is, by virtue of her reproductive role, short term, occasional.
Women as a class are implicated by such policies, socially and economi-
cally. 0 7 Under the PDA, such policies should be challengeable on dispa-
rate impact grounds, as they circumscribe the "terms [and] conditions"1 8
of women's employment "because of or on the basis of pregnancy."' 1 9 The
absence of men in a particular job category renders the sexual norm upon
which a pregnancy exclusion is predicated less apparent-not less real.
V. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT
Pregnancy discrimination exhibits a coherent social logic. The exclusion
of the pregnant employee reaffirms woman's essential nature as maternal,
her proper sphere as domestic. Pregnancy-based exclusions disrupt
women's labor force participation, thus ensuring that they remain second
class, occasional labor. The cycle is self-perpetuating: Social practice de-
termines the meaning of a woman's biology, even as biology appears to be
determining women's social fate.
Since the early nineteenth century, women's maternal role has been un-
derstood to render them unfit for employment." 0 Since the turn of the
106. Public school teachers and airline flight attendants have figured most frequently as plaintiffs
in pregnancy discrimination litigation. (For examples of public school regulation, see Thompson v.
Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp. 1035 (W.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983), and of
airline regulation, see supra pp. 944-45.) The predominance of young women of childbearing age in
these jobs has not disposed employers to view the situation of the pregnant employee as normal, but
rather to intensify its exclusionary regulation. The general animus toward pregnancy in the work-
place is readily exacerbated in sex-typed occupational roles. As a comparison of the school and airline
contexts suggests, the pregnant employee can violate her prescribed role by displaying either an excess,
or a lack, of sexuality.
107. It has long been recognized that the occupational segregation of women enables employers to
reap the benefits of their depressed earning capacity. See C. DEGLER, supra note 102, at 424-25
(wage disparity is "the most obvious cause, and consequence for women, of [a] long history of job
segregation"). When a job has been defined to exclude pregnancy, women's labor force participation is
disrupted, and wages further depressed. Congress recognized the interactive role of pregnancy discrim-
ination and job segregation in exacerbating the wage gap, citing it as a compelling reason for adopting
the PDA. See 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams); S. REP. No. 331, supra
note 13, at 6.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
110. The ideology of separate spheres (which denominates productive labor male and domestic
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century, women's employment has been subjected to pronatalist regula-
tion, circumscribed in the name of a public interest in their reproductive
capacity. 11' Employers have consistently excluded the pregnant employee,
when it was in their economic self-interest, and even when it was not." 2
Eradicating pregnancy discrimination will require confronting and dis-
mantling this history-not by denying women's reproductive difference,
but by reforming the institutions that have constructed its social meaning.
Litigation of PDA claims to date has failed to confront the relation of
reproductive difference to women's secondary socio-economic status. Ad-
herents to a parity interpretation of the amendment recognize that preg-
nant women have been subjected to exclusionary treatment in the work-
place, but propose to rectify this tradition by denying that pregnancy
labor female) can be traced to the early nineteenth century, when industrialization initiated the re-
moval of production from the home. See, e.g., N. Corr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 63-74 (1977);
A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 105, at 45-72; J. MATTHAEI, supra note 102, at 101-19; Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1499-1501 (1983). During the nineteenth century, the cult of domesticity defined women's role with
reference to family obligations; employment of wives and mothers was asserted to conflict with the
primary duty they owed to home life. In the early twentieth century, the cult of domesticity fused with
eugenicist concerns. Rhetoric of familial obligation was displaced by rhetoric of biological necessity,
and objections to women's employment came to focus specifically on their reproductive role. Women's
employment was now asserted to threaten, not only the integrity of the family, but the vitality of the
race. For a succinct illustration of this transformation, compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130,
141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The harmony [of] the family institution is repugnant to the
idea of a woman adopting [an] independent career from that of her husband.") with Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (regulation of women's employment necessary "to preserve the strength
and vigor of the race"). See generally L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 126-58 (1976) (excellent documentation of eugenics
movement); M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (R. Hurley trans. 1978) (especially Part
IV) (theoretical account of eugenics movement within history of middle-class political culture).
111. During a period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was held to bar state regulation of the
employment relationship, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), regulation of women's em-
ployment was upheld by the Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908), on
the following grounds:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the bur-
dens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the
medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to
day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
For a doctrinal history of protectionist legislation, see J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION (1978). For an excellent historical overview
of protectionist regulation of women's employment, see A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 105, at
180-214. Regulation specified maximum hours and minimum wages, prohibited night work, and im-
posed blanket exclusions of women from particular occupations. See generally WOMEN'S BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 66-I, CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR LEGISLATION
IN THE UNITED STATES (1932) (catalogue of legislation by state).
112. Pregnancy-based discharges and mandatory maternity leaves operate to deprive employers of
skilled employees. In the public school context, for example, such policies have traditionally operated
to disrupt the service of teachers during the academic year. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 640-43 (1974); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 n.5 (1977)
(policy of denying seniority to employees returning from maternity leave favors inexperienced over
experienced employees, and affects morale of female employees generally).
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poses any relevant legal differences whatsoever. By refusing, in the name
of equality, to acknowledge the biological and social specificity of women's
reproductive role, the parity standard naturalizes an entire history of an-
tipathy to the pregnant employee: Pregnancy is a disability like any
other.'13
Social relations are hierarchically organized around the reproductive
difference that exists between women and men. 14 Reproductive difference
is socially selected to define gender, and in this process, given social value
by institutions and ideologies of inequality. As a growing number of femi-
nist scholars now argue, a doctrine of sexual equality must recognize re-
productive difference in order to scrutinize inegalitarian relations predi-
cated upon it in the political and economic spheres."' The fact of
113. Wendy Williams has provided the most sustained defense of the parity standard to date. See
Williams, supra note 15. She strenuously opposes legal recognition of reproductive difference on doc-
trinal and historical grounds. For Williams, there is no distinction between doctrinal recognition of
pregnancy-specific rights and doctrinal ratification of practices that penalize women on the basis of
pregnancy. "If we can't have it both ways, we need to think carefully about which way we want to
have it." Id. at 196. Williams views the claim to job security for pregnant women as perpetuating the
legacy of protectionist legislation.
Williams' doctrinal analysis is constrained by an excessive formalism. A distinction can and should
be drawn between laws and practices that assume pregnancy to be antithetical to employment, and
those that presume their compatibility. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Equal Rights Advocates at 35-38,
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, Nos. 84-5843 and 84-5844 (9th Cir. 1984); Krieger &
Cooney, supra note 15, at 531-33.
Williams raises a more compelling concern when she argues that recognizing pregnancy-specific
rights may perpetuate the legacy of protectionist legislation. As a key proponent of the PDA, she does
not, however, advocate that the state refrain from regulating in the field. Rather, she apparently
believes that the state can, and should, intervene to protect women in sex-neutral terms; and that such
an intervention is both necessary and sufficient to alter attitudes toward pregnancy in the workplace.
But the parity standard Williams would have the state enforce is not sex-neutral. The state cannot
regulate a sex-specific condition in sex-neutral terms; a judgment about women is necessarily involved.
It can, however, attempt to neutralize the sex-specific effects of its former regulatory policies by ensur-
ing that pregnancy is treated as a normal condition of employment. Such an intervention is preferable
to Williams' proposal that the state once again regulate women's employment in terms that character-
ize pregnancy as a disability, however normal. Furthermore, characterizing pregnancy as a normal
disability will not, as Williams suggests, alleviate hostility toward pregnancy in the workplace. Be-
cause the parity standard does not eliminate real conflicts between pregnancy and employment, it will
not eradicate the deep-seated belief that women's reproductive role unfits them for employment. In-
deed, it gives it new legitimacy. When the state claims to remedy a history of employment discrimina-
tion against pregnant women, eliminating only overt expressions of that tradition and leaving its
deeper institutional legacy intact, it legitimates, as natural, inequalities having a determinate social
history. According women "equality" on such terms dispossesses them of an equality claim commen-
surate with this history.
114. Mary O'Brien gives far-ranging explication to this thesis in M. O'BRIEN, THE POLITICS OF
REPRODUCTION (1981). Her analysis is flawed, however, by its incomplete repudiation of biological
explanations for the social relations she so acutely describes. For similar analysis advanced in consist-
ently social terms, see Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL
AMERICA 234-37 (1984).
115. A variety of feminists have advanced theories of equality premised on recognition and affir-
mation of sexual difference. Their work is critically reviewed by Zillah Eisenstein, supra note 114, at
161-254, who refuses to relinquish a vision of heterogeneous human possibilities. Eisenstein argues,
however, that such a transformation in gender relations can be achieved only by dismantling the
ideologies and institutions subordinating women on the basis of their reproductive role. A theory of
sexual equality must recognize this biological difference between the sexes in order to depoliticize it.
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reproductive difference should neither foreclose equality analysis,' 16 nor
deflect it into a search for comparable cross-sex characteristics."' Rather,
direct inquiry is warranted: Do laws, policies, and practices that exert a
differential impact on the sexes by virtue of reproductive difference serve
to perpetuate women's secondary socio-economic status, or to maintain sex
roles integral to that status?"" This inquiry into the social valuation of
sexual difference lacks the obvious coherence of the more traditional, for-
malist inquiry: Has similar treatment been accorded the similarly situ-
ated? But given that "the sexes are neither the same nor, in a sexist soci-
ety, similarly situated,""' 9 this inquiry possesses a practical power
formalist analysis necessarily lacks.'2 0 Doctrine must explore the social
logic of sex discrimination if it is to eradicate more than its formal
manifestations. 12
Id. at 206-07. For similar developments in feminist legal scholarship, see Law, supra note 10; see
also Krieger & Cooney, supra note 15; Scales, supra note 15.
116. This is in essence the holding of the Gilbert opinion and of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), the constitutional precedent whose reasoning Gilbert adopted.
117. This is in essence the model of the parity standard, which insists, without exception, that
treatment of pregnancy be evaluated with reference to other (non-reproductive) disabilities. For a
discussion of the "problem of the strained analogy" endemic to scrutinizing sex differences in terms of
comparable cross-sex characteristics, see Krieger & Cooney, supra note 15, at 539-44.
118. For purposes of constitutional analysis, Sylvia Law has proposed that:
laws governing reproductive biology should be scrutinized by courts to ensure that (1) the law
has no significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or culturally imposed
sex-role constraints on individual freedom or (2) if the law has this impact, it is justified as the
best means of serving a compelling state purpose.
Law, supra note 10, at 1008-09. Law would limit this inquiry to laws governing reproductive biol-
ogy. Her formulation of the test, however, derives from a more far-reaching inquiry proposed by
Catharine MacKinnon, who would recast sex discrimination analysis in the following terms:
The only question for litigation is whether the policy or practice in question integrally contrib-
utes to the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender status. The
disadvantage which constitutes the injury of discrimination is not the failure to be treated
"without regard to" one's sex .... The unfairness lies in being deprived because of being a
woman or a man, a deprivation given meaning in the social context of the dominance or pref-
erence of one sex over the other....
Under the inequality approach, variables as to which women and men are not comparable,
such as pregnancy or sexuality, would be among the first to trigger suspicion and scrutiny,
rather than the last ....
C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 117-18.
119. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 119.
120. The creed of similar treatment for the similarly situated expresses the normative vision that
the sexes ought stand as political and economic equals. The transformative power of this vision is
considerably diminished when it is transposed into an analytical method for evaluating equality
claims. Where the normative principle of equality among the "similarly situated" is taken as a
description of those raising equality claims deserving of legal recognition, analysis will tend to ratify
existing inequalities, rather than eradicate them. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 101-41.
121. Race discrimination has a publicly adjudicated history, one which repudiates biological ex-
planations of racial status, acknowledging the role of attitudes and institutions in perpetuating racial
hierarchy. By contrast, the law of sex discrimination has yet to develop such a history. Its reliance on
the simple notion of "stereotypes" does not do justice to the complex ideological and institutional basis
of sexual hierarchy, a system that relies on differences-real and imagined, made and found-to
legitimate itself. Within the system, all differences invoked to justify women's socio-economic status
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CONCLUSION
Sexual equality does not concern the innate similarity, but the relative
social status of the sexes. Women may raise a pregnancy-specific equality
claim because society has consistently selected that "difference" as a basis
for their economic subordination. Where tradition has presumed the in-
compatibility of pregnancy and employment, the PDA now substitutes a
countervailing presumption of compatibility. Its mandate, fully consistent
with Title VII's larger remedial objectives, must be given full force. Rec-
ognizing a disparate impact claim of pregnancy discrimination would re-
quire simply that pregnancy be treated as a normal condition of employ-
ment, barring institutional as well as individual presumptions to the
contrary. At root, recognizing such a claim accords women the dignity of a
history-acknowledging that the primary determinants of their economic
status are social, not biological, in origin.
-Reva B. Siegel
are functional equivalents, whether stereotypically, statistically, or absolutely true. They serve to jus-
tify women's status where a social allocation of power is so deeply embedded as to appear part of the
natural order of things. An antidiscrimination doctrine that defines equality as a matter of similarity
and equivalence, without inquiring into the genesis and logic of "differences" among the socially
unequal, will create a law of equality hopelessly unequal to its stated object. The danger is that such
a law will itself naturalize the inequities it purports, comprehensively, to proscribe.
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